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CASE NOTES

ANTITRUST-NONPROFIT PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION LIABLE FOR TREBLE DAMAGES UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT FOR THE ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
OF ITS AGENTS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
THEIR APPARENT AUTHORITY-American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct.
1935 (1982).
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
is a nonprofit technical and scientific society with more than
90,000 members, drawn from all fields of mechanical engineering.1 The Society publishes a mechanical engineering magazine and conducts educational and research programs.2 In addition to its other functions, ASME promulgates
approximately 400 codes and standards related to mechanical
engineering." These codes have a powerful economic influence,
even though they are only advisory in nature.4 Many of these
codes are incorporated by reference into federal, state, and local laws and regulations. 5 Although ASME employs a full-time
staff, much of its work is done by volunteers from industry
and government. These volunteers participate as individuals,
not as representatives of their employers, and assist in drafting, revising, and interpreting ASME's codes.7
Included among the various standards and codes established by ASME is its boiler and pressure vessel code.' The
01983 by Elizabeth Smith.

1. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct.
1935 (1982).
2. Id. at 1938.

3.
4.
vantage
5.

Id.
If a "product cannot satisfy the applicable ASME code, it is at a great disadin the marketplace." Id.
As an example, the court of appeals cited 12 N.Y. CODE R. & REG. §§ 4-1.9, 4-

1.10 (1979). Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2di 118,
121 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).

6. Id. at 121.
7.
8.

Id.
102 S. Ct. at 1938.
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code relevant to this case is paragraph HG-605 of section IV
of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which contains a provision setting a standard for low-water fuel cutoffs.9 Lowwater fuel cutoffs are a safety feature that shuts off the supply
of fuel in a boiler if the water level falls below a certain point,
thus preventing a possible explosion.10
For several decades, the market for low-water fuel cutoffs
was dominated by McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M&M)."1 However, in the mid-1960's, M&M's market position was challenged when Hydrolevel Corporation began marketing its own
version of the low-water fuel cutoff.1 2 The relevant distinction

between the safety devices was that Hydrolevel's fuel cutoff
included a time delay, while M&M's did not."
In 1971, Brooklyn Union Gas Company, which had purchased M&M's fuel cutoff for several years, decided to switch
to Hydrolevel's cutoff. This was a matter of concern to those
who ran M&M.14

John James, a vice-president of M&M, was also vicechairman of the ASME subcommittee that drafted, revised,
and interpreted section IV of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code.1" "After Hydrolevel [secured] the Brooklyn Union Gas
account, James and other M&M officials met with T. R. Har9. Section IV of The Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code sets forth standards for
boilers. Each boiler "shall have an automatic low-water fuel cutoff so located as to
automatically cut off the fuel supply when the surface of the water falls to the lowest
visible part of the water gauge glass." Id. at 1939 (quoting I HG-605 of § IV of the
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code).
10. 102 S. Ct. at 1939.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
M&M's fuel cutoff is a floating bulb that falls with the boiler's water
level. When the level reaches the critical point, the bulb causes a switch
to cut off the boiler's fuel supply. Hydrolevel's product, in contrast, was
an immovable probe inserted in the side of the boiler; when the water
level dropped below the probe, the fuel supply was interrupted. Because
water in a boiler surges and bubbles, the level intermittently would seem
to fall slightly below the probe even though the overall level remained
safe. To prevent premature fuel cutoff because of these intermittent
fluctuations, Hydrolevel's probe included a time delay that allowed the
boiler to operate for a brief period after the water level dropped beneath
the probe.
Id. at 1939 n.1.
14. Id. at 1939.
15. Id.
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din, . . . chairman of the Section IV Subcommittee." 6 The
participants at this meeting decided to send an inquiry from
M&M to ASME's Boiler and Pressure Vessel committee asking whether a fuel cutoff with a time delay, such as
Hydrolevel's, would satisfy the requirements of paragraph
17
HG-605 of section IV.
Following ASME's standard procedure, the letter of inquiry was referred to Hardin, as chairman of the Boiler and
Pressure Vessel subcommittee.1 8 Thus, the response to the inquiry was prepared by Hardin, who in actuality co-authored
the letter which initiated the inquiry/response process."' Predictably, Hardin's response interpreted paragraph HG-605 as
condemning fuel cutoffs such as those marketed by
Hydrolevel, which incorporated a time-delay.' 0 Subsequently,
the secretary of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee
signed and mailed the response prepared by Hardin without
checking its accuracy.21 It later became evident that Hardin
had misrepresented the intent of paragraph HG-605 in his
response.2
Thereafter, M&M utilized this interpretation of section
IV to discourage customers from buying Hydrolevel's product.28 Several months after the ASME subcommittee issued
its response, Hydrolevel learned of the subcommittee's action
through a former customer.' 4 Recognizing that the interpretation of the code was misleading, Hydrolevel sought a correc16. Id. "Hardin was an Executive Vice President of Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company. A controlling interest in Hartford was owned by
International Telephone and Telegraph Co. which acquired M&M within the year."
Id. at 1939.
17. Id. at 1939.
18. Id. "Under the procedures of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee, the
subcommittee chairman-Hardin-could draft a response to a public inquiry without
referring it to the entire subcommittee if he treated it as an 'unofficial communication.'" Id. at 1939-40.
19. Id. at 1940.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 122
(2d Cir. 1980). The court of appeals observed that "[i]f the low-water cutoff is positioned sufficiently above the lowest permissible water level, a cutoff with a time delay
could assure, even allowing for the delay, that the fuel supply would stop by the time
the water fell to the lowest visible part of the water gauge glass." Id.
23. 102 S. Ct. at 1940. "[M&M] instructed its salesmen to [inform] potential
customers that Hydrolevel's fuel cutoff failed to satisfy ASME's code." Id.
24. Id.
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tion from ASME."
Two years later, the Wall Street Journal printed an article describing the market resistance which Hydrolevel was experiencing while attempting to sell a fuel cutoff which the
market still believed did not meet the standards of the code. 6
The article suggested that a "marketing ploy" by M&M had
created that belief in the marketplace.' ASME's Professional
Practice Committee conducted an investigation in response to
this article, but concluded that all of its officials had acted
properly. 8 Subsequently, while testifying before a U.S. Senate
Subcommittee, James revealed his part in drafting the original letter of inquiry." A few months later, Hydrolevel filed
suit in federal district court against ASME, alleging that its
actions had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.30
The trial court instructed the jury "that ASME could be
held liable only if it had ratified its agents' actions or if
[those] agents had acted in pursuit of ASME's interests.""1
The jury returned a verdict for Hydrolevel.5 ' The court of appeals affirmed the finding of liability, but held that the jury
instructions given by the district court were incorrect. The appellate court concluded that ASME could be held liable if its
agents had acted within the scope of their apparent authority.88 In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeal's finding, and held that ASME
was liable under the antitrust laws for the antitrust violations
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1941.
27. 635 F.2d at 123.
28. 102 S.Ct. at 1941.
29. Id.
30. Id. Section 1 of the Sherman Act specifies that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states. . . is declared to be illegal." Section 2 of the Sherman Act
states that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states.

. .

shall be guilty of a felony. . .

."

15 U.S.C. §§ 1,

2 (1976). Hydrolevel alleged that ASME had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
in conspiring "with others to restrain trade unreasonably in the low-water [fuel]
cutoff market by disparaging Hydrolevel's cutoff through a misrepresentation of the
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code." 635 F.2d at 124.
31. 102 S.Ct. at 1941. The trial court denied Hydrolevel's request for jury instructions that stated that ASME could be held liable for its agents' conduct if those
agents acted within the scope of their apparent authority. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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of its agents acting with apparent authority.3 4
The Court began its analysis by noting that under general
agency rules, a principal is liable for the acts of its agents performed with apparent authority.85 Next, the Court stated that
holding a nonprofit organization liable under a theory of apparent authority was consistent with the congressional intent
behind the antitrust laws, that is, to encourage competition."
The Court noted that "[w]hen [ASME] cloaks its subcommittee officials with authority of its reputation, [it] permits those
agents to affect the destinies of businesses and thus gives
them the power to frustrate competition in the
marketplace.""7
The Court stated that deterrence was an additional reason for imposing civil liability on the organization itself, as
well as on the agents who were acting with apparent authority. 8' The Court noted that imposing liability on ASME's
agents themselves would act as a partial deterrent against restraints on competition, because of the risk of personal civil
liability. 89 If ASME were also civilly liable for the antitrust
violations of its agents who acted with apparent authority, it
would be much more likely that similar antitrust violations
would not occur in the future.40
34. Id. at 1942. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the important
issue concerning the interpretation of the antitrust laws. Id.
35. Id. The Court explained that the apparent authority doctrine was premised

on the theory that the fraud was facilitated by the agent's position. Because of the
agent's position, the agent seemed to have been acting in the ordinary course of the

business entrusted to him. The agent's statements were given weight by virtue of the
principal's reputation-in this case, the weight of ASME's expertise in boiler safety.
Id.
36.

Id. at 1944.

37. Id. The Court pointed to the facts of this case to illustrate the power of
ASME's agents to restrain competition and engage in anticompetitive activity. Although M&M received a mere "unofficial" response to its inquiry about the time de-

lay feature, "the force of ASME's reputation is so great that M&M was able to use
that one 'unofficial' response to injure seriously the business of a competitor." Id.
38. Id. at 1945.
39.

Id.

40. The Court stated:
Only ASME can take systematic steps to make improper conduct on the
part of all its agents unlikely, and the possibility of civil liability will
inevitably be a powerful incentive for ASME to take those steps. Thus,
a rule that imposes liability on the standard-setting organization-which
is best suited to prevent antitrust violations through the abuse of its

reputation-is most faithful to the congressional intent that the private
right of action deter antitrust violations.
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The Court illustrated the wisdom of the apparent authority rule by comparing it to the two alternative approaches advocated by ASME.41 First, ASME argued that "it should not
be held liable unless it ratified the actions of its agents."'
The Court rejected this argument, noting that requiring ratification would actually have anticompetitive effects; ASME
by simply remaining ignorant of its
could avoid liability
48
activities.
agents'
Second, ASME argued that it would only be held liable
for its agents' actions if the agents acted with an intent to
benefit ASME." The Court noted that intent to benefit
ASME was irrelevant, because its agents' conduct could have
anticompetitive effects without benefitting ASME. 43
Finally, the Court rejected two additional arguments advanced by ASME in its attempt to avoid antitrust liability.
First, ASME labeled treble damages for antitrust violations as
punitive. ASME argued that under traditional agency law, the
courts did not use apparent authority to impose punitive
damages upon a principal for the acts of its agents."O The
Court rejected this argument, noting that while antitrust
treble damages were designed in part to punish past antitrust
violatiops, they were also designed to deter future antitrust
violations.4
In addition, ASME argued that because of its status as a
nonprofit organization, it should not bear the risk of loss for
antitrust violations committed by its agents acting with apparent authority. 48 Rejecting this argument, the Court emphasized that the weight of precedent supported a finding that
nonprofit organizations could be held liable under the antiId. at 1945-46.
41. Id. at 1946.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Court noted that "[w]hether they intend to benefit ASME or not,
ASME's agents exercise economic power because they act with the force of the Society's reputation behind them." Id.
46. Id. at 1946-47.

47. The Court cited Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
485-86 (1977) in noting that "[t]reble damages 'make the remedy meaningful by
counterbalancing' the difficulty of maintaining a private suit under the antitrust
laws." 102 S. Ct. at 1947 (quoting 429 U.S. at 486 n.10).
48. 102 S. Ct. at 1947.
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trust laws. 4e The Court concluded by noting that its decision
"will help to ensure that standard-setting organizations will
act with care when they permit their agents to speak for
them."5"

Emphasizing that the apparent authority theory has long
been the settled rule in the federal system, the Court relied on
Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Co. 51 That case held that a

principal is liable when the agent commits fraud while acting
within the scope of the agent's apparent authority, even
though there is no intention to benefit the principal." The
Court noted that "[i]n a wide variety of areas, the federal
courts, like this Court in Gleason, have imposed liability upon
principals for the misdeeds of agents acting with apparent
authority."5 8

The Court then examined the extent to which antitrust
liability had been imposed in the past for acts analogous to
tort violations, such as those at issue in ASME. The Court
observed that "in the past, the Court has refused to permit
broad common law defenses to constrict the antitrust private
right of action.""
The Court concluded that the apparent authority rule
49. Id. The Court cited Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656 (1961) and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
50. 102 S. Ct. at 1948.
51. 278 U.S. 349 (1929).
52. 102 S. Ct. at 1943. "In Gleason, a railroad's employee sought to enrich himself by defrauding a customer of the railroad through a forged bill of lading ....
Noting that 'there was . . .no want of authority in the agent,' . . . the Court in
Gleason held [the] railroad liable, despite the agent's desire to benefit only himself."
Id. The Gleason Court emphasized that "few doctrines of law are more firmly established . . .than that of the liability of the principal without fault of his own." 278
U.S. 349, 356.
53. 102 S. Ct. at 1943. The Court explained that although it looked to the general principles of common law for guidance in deciding the scope of the antitrust
cause of action, its decisions were determined by the congressional intent that led to
the enactment of the antitrust laws-a desire to enhance competition. The Court
pointed out that in this case, general agency principles would lead to a finding of
liability if the violation were a mere tort. By imposing liability on ASME in accord
with those common law principles, the Court was honoring the congressional intent
behind those antitrust statutes. Id. at 1943-44 n.6.
54. Id. at 1944. To illustrate, the Court quoted Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968): "'the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served
by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat' to deter antitrust
violations." The Court concluded that they could "honor the statutory purpose behind the antitrust laws best by interpreting the antitrust private cause of action to be
at least as broad as a plaintiff's right to sue for analogous torts, absent indications
that the antitrust laws are not intended to reach so far." 102 S. Ct. 1944.
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was consistent with the congressional intent that the antitrust
laws were to be broad in scope. 8 The Court noted that Congress extended antitrust liability to "every person," and defined "person" to include corporations and associations." The
Court acknowledged that in recent years only one circuit court
had directly decided whether a principal could be held liable
for antitrust damages based on an apparent authority theory.5 7 The Court rejected ASME's argument that the Court
had foreclosed imposition of civil antitrust liability based on
apparent authority in prior cases.58
Addressing ASME's argument that punitive damages had
never been imposed on a principal for the acts of its agents
under a theory of apparent authority, the Court noted that a
majority of courts had imposed punitive damages on corporations because of their agents' acts in the absence of approval
or ratification."9 The Court relied on Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co. e0 and found that nonprofit
organizations could be held liable under the antitrust laws.
Radiant Burners illustrated the scope of antitrust liability
under agency principles prior to this case. The Court in Radi55. 102 S. Ct. at 1946 n.11.
56. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 7 (1976)).
57. 102 S. Ct. at 1944 n.7. The Court noted that
[t]he dissent cites several cases, stating that they appear to reject antitrust liability based on an apparent authority. United States v. Cadillac
Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
903 (1978); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004-07
(9th Cir. 1972) cert. denied sub. nom. Western Int'l Hotels Co. v. United
States, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); United States v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 948 (1971). A fair reading of those cases, however, reveals that
they did not discuss the merits of an apparent authority theory of antitrust liability.
102 S. Ct. at 1944 n.7.
58. 102 S. Ct. at 1946 n.12. The Court noted in particular United Mine Workers
v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) and Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925). The Court maintained that those cases were not controlling, observing that the United Mine Workers Court expressly pointed out that
that case did not involve a question of an appearance of authority on which some
third person acted. 102 S. Ct. at 1946 n.12.
59. 102 S. Ct. at 1947 n.14.
60. 364 U.S. 656 (1961). In Radiant Burners, the Court held that the complaint
of a gas burner manufacturer alleging that a nonprofit association and its members
had conspired to restrain interstate commerce in the manufacture, sale, and use of
gas burners by reason of the association's unreasonable failure to approve the manufacturer's burners, resulting in refusal of association's utility members to supply gas
for use in those burners, was sufficient to state a claim for treble damages. Id.
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ant Burners imposed antitrust liability on the principal organization for the ratified acts of its agents. 61
Disagreeing with the ASME majority's extension of the
antitrust liability of a principal beyond that prescribed by Radiant Burners and its predecessors, Justice Powell dissented,
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Powell stated
that the Court's expansive rule of antitrust liability was inconsistent with the weight of precedent and congressional intent. 2 The dissent's major criticism of the Court's decision
was the lack of authority to support the holding that the apparent authority theory was applicable in an antitrust case. 5
The dissent stated that the Court ignored prior decisions
which suggested that in dealing with professional associations
the antitrust laws should not be applied precisely as they are
when commercial enterprises are involved." The dissent also
noted that in the past, the Court had been hesitant to impose
treble damage liability on a membership organization in the
absence of clear evidence showing ratification or authorization."6 The dissent observed that "[e]ven in the context of
commercial enterprises, the courts of appeals that have considered the matter appear to have rejected antitrust liability
upon mere apparent authority.""
The dissent next disputed the Court's conclusion that the
61. Id.
62. 102 S. Ct. at 1949.
63. Id. at 1950. "In a word," the dissent stated, "the Court makes new law,
largely ignoring existing precedent." Id.
64. The dissent cited in support Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975), in which the Court recognized that "[i]t would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically apply to the professions antitrust concepts that originated in other areas." 102
S. Ct. at 1949-50 (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17). The dissent argued that
"[iln view of this recognition, one would not have expected the Court to take the
occasion of this case to promulgate an expansive rule of antitrust liability not heretofore applied by it to a commercial enterprise much less to a nonprofit organization."
102 S.Ct. at 1950.
65. The dissent cited United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344
(1921) and Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925). Elaborating in a footnote, the dissent disagreed with the Court's interpretation of United
Mine Workers, arguing that in those cases, the Court rejected antitrust liability on a
theory of apparent authority. 102 S. Ct. at 1950 n.5.
66. 102 S.Ct. at 1950. As an example, the dissent cited United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), wherein the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ruled out liability on apparent authority by requiring that the agent
hold a "purpose to benefit the corporation." 102 S.Ct. at 1950 n.6 (citing Hilton
Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1006 n.4).
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apparent authority theory was consistent with the congressional intent behind the antitrust laws. In particular, the dissent maintained that the legislative history in fact cautioned
against adopting a new rule of agency law that exposed nonprofit organizations to potentially destructive treble damage
7
liability.
The dissent also pointed out that section 1 of the Sherman Act required a contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade." The dissent asserted that since neither a
contract nor a combination was present in ASME, by implication, the Court imposed antitrust liability on ASME on the
dubiousee notion that ASME somehow "conspired" with
M&M.
The dissent's final criticism concerned the policy implications behind holding a nonprofit, industry standard-setting
organization like ASME liable under the antitrust laws. The
dissent pointed out that the Court's policy discussion did not
take into account the potential cost involved. Justice Powell
expressed concern that the decision jeopardizes a significant
70
consumer benefit-ASME's boiler safety information.
The Court's decision to expand the current scope of antitrust liability under agency principles is novel. As the dissent
correctly pointed out, there is no authority for imposing liability for apparent authority in an antitrust case. Prior to this
case, the Court would impose antitrust liability on a principal
only when it had ratified the agent's acts or when the agent
had acted with an intent to benefit the principal.7 1 Subsequent to this case, principals are now liable for their agents'
67. 102 S. Ct. at 1952. The dissent relied on statements made by Senator Sherman in defending his bill during Senate debate: "The bill as reported contains three
or four simple propositions which relate only to contracts, combinations, and agreeIt does not
ments made with a view and designed to carry out a certain purpose ....
interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations. . . to advance the interests of a particular trade or occupation . . . .They are not business combinations."
Id. (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 2562 (1890)). See also 21 Cong. Rec. 2658 (1890).
68. 102 S.Ct. at 1956.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1956-57. The dissent reasoned that this "information can be expensive if consumers are forced to gain it only by their own experience or by creation of
another bureaucracy." Id. at 1957.
71. As the dissent observed: "[A] trade union. . . might be held liable . . . but
certainly it must be clearly shown in order to impose such a liability on an association
of 450,000 men that what was done was done by their agents in accordance with their
fundamental agreement of association." 102 S.Ct. at 1950 n.5 (quoting Coronado
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 304 (1925)).
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antitrust violations if those agents act with an appearance of
authority.
The Court recognized that trade associations exert tremendous economic influence on the industry they represent.
As the Court itself pointed out, the policy behind extending
antitrust liability to the principal is to provide an additional
mechanism for deterring antitrust violations."' The Court has
created a powerful incentive for nonprofit organizations to institute procedures to review the conduct of their agents.7" It is
likely that a number of professional organizations, such as the
American Medical Association and the American Bar Association, will institute procedures to more carefully review their
members' actions.
A question remains as to how far the Court's rationale
will be extended. As the dissent pointed out, the Court emphasized that ASME is a standard-setting organization, yet
did not limit its rationale to those particular organizations.
Reading the Court's decision broadly, it can be interpreted as
extending liability to all types of nonprofit organizations, including professional, charitable, educational, and religious
groups. The only indication to date of the scope of the Court's
holding is the recent decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.7 4 In that case, the Court stated that the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, like any
other organization, could be held responsible for the nationwide acts of its agents that were undertaken within the scope
75
of their actual or apparent authority.
The Court's ASME decision is one of the most important
of the term. The Court applied the apparent authority theory
of antitrust liability to professional associations for the first
time, thereby providing a new mechanism to regulate such organizations' activities. This case held that a nonprofit standard-setting association is liable for the antitrust violations of
its agents acting within the scope of their apparent authority.
72.

102 S. Ct. at 1945.

73. Id.
74. 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
75. Id. at 3435. In NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., the organization was
sued by white merchants for injunctive relief and damages suffered as a result of an
NAACP boycott. The Court cited ASME in discussing the apparent authority theory,
but refused to impose liability on the NAACP, claiming that there was no finding
that the agent in question had actual or apparent authority from the NAACP to commit acts of violence. Id.
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It also established that the apparent authority theory is consistent with the congressional intent behind the antitrust laws
to encourage competitions.
The ramifications of ASME's expansion of antitrust liability are not entirely clear. The Court has yet to address the
question of whether this new theory of antitrust liability will
affect the factors that are applied to determine whether an
agent has acted within the scope of his apparent authority.
Elizabeth Smith

76. A final element of the Court's holding is that treble damages are not punitive, since they were designed in part to deter future antitrust violations. 102 S. Ct. at
1947.

FIRST AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY, OBSCENE OR NOT, POSSESSES NO
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION-New York v. Ferber, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (1982).
9
Defendant, Paul Ferber, a Manhattan adult bookstore
owner, sold to New York undercover agents two films depicting young boys masturbating. 1 Ferber was subsequently indicted for violating two New York Penal Laws: section 263.10,
prohibiting the promotion of an obscene sexual performance
by a child," and section 263.15, prohibiting the promotion of a
performance, not necessarily obscene, of a child engaged in a
sexual act.8
Prior to trial, Ferber moved to have the charges dismissed, on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional.
The motion was denied.4 Ferber was acquitted of violating
New York Penal Law section 263.10 after the jury found the
films pornographic but not obscene.' The jury found the defendant guilty, however, of violating the broader anti-child
pornography statute of section 263.15.
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction without a written opinion." The New
York Court of Appeals reversed, finding section 263.15 both
overinclusive and underinclusive7 and thus violative of the
c1983 by Duane Shewaga
1. New York v. Ferber, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3352 (1982).
2. Section 263.10 provides: "A person is guilty of promoting an obscene sexual
performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any obscene performance which includes sexual conduct
by a child less than sixteen years of age." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.10 (McKinney 1980).
3. Section 263.15 provides: "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs
or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1980).
4. People v. Ferber, 96 Misc. 2d 669, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1978), aff'd, 72 A.D.2d
558, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1980), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523 (1981).
5. "The jury acquitted him of 'promoting an obscene sexual performance by a
child,' drawing a fine distinction between materials that are not legally obscene but
are considered pornographic." Child Pornography Verdict Overturned, N.Y. Times,
May 17, 1981, at E5, col. 5.
6. 72 A.D.2d 558, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1980), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523
(1981).
7. 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523 (1981). See supra note 3.
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free speech protections provided for in the first amendment.8
The court of appeals found the statute overinclusive because
it prohibited the promotion of medical or educational materials depicting children performing sexual acts which are protected by the first amendment 9 as well as the promotion of
commercial child pornography. In addition, the statute not
only affected children of the state of New York, but also outof-state and foreign children by potentially prohibiting films
made outside of New York. Thus, the court of appeals held
that the New York State Legislature exceeded its power by
failing to pursue only the protection of New York children."0
The court of appeals found that the means used to pursue
the protection of youthful performers in film was not expansive enough and therefore the statute was found underinclusive. 11 The court of appeals reasoned that for the legislature to
properly pursue the ends sought, the legislature should have
also prohibited the promotion of films which exposed a child
actor to dangers other than sexual abuse, such as a film which
employed a child in a dangerous stunt."
The United States Supreme Court reversed the New York
Court of Appeals and upheld the conviction of the defendant,
holding that the statute did not violate the first amendment."
The Court found that the statute was neither overbroad nor
underinclusive and that child pornography, obscene or not,
was not entitled to first amendment protection.1" Consequently, the United States Supreme Court granted greater
latitude to the states in formulating regulations concerning
child pornography.
8. The first amendment states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of Speech.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. 52 N.Y.2d at 676, 422 N.E.2d at 525.
10. The New York Court of Appeals indicated that only the protection of the
children of New York was a legitimate state interest. "To the extent the statute
would purport to regulate the sexual performances of children throughout the world,
there is some question as to whether that goal, however commendable, necessarily
comes within the police powers of the State of New York." Id. at 677, 422 N.E.2d at
526.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 102 S. Ct. at 3350, 3358, 3364. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court,
with Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joining. Justices O'Connor,
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens filed concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result.
14. Id. at 3348-50, 3358, 3360, 3363.
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The Supreme Court found five reasons for granting
greater latitude to the states in barring the promotion of child
pornography. First, the Supreme Court recognized that a state
has a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
mental health of a child.1 5 The Court deferred to the legislative finding that child pornography harms a child's physical,
emotional, and mental health. ' The detrimental effects resulting from the use of children in pornography cited by the
Court included: 1) the children's failure to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life, 2) the development of
sexual dysfunctions in these children, 3) the creation of a tendency in these children to become sexual abusers as adults, 4)
the sexual molestation inflicted on these children by their
adult employers, and 5) the invasion of the children's privacy.17 Thus, the Court concluded that the "prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance."18

Secondly, the Supreme Court found that the state could
control the distribution of child pornography, because such
distribution contributes to the sexual abuse of a child in at
least two ways. First, the materials produced leave a permanent record of the child's participation in sexual activity. Consequently, a child may be hounded for life with a pictorial record of his misdeed." Second, the distribution of child
pornography provides a conduit for the marketing of a product that involves the sexual abuse of a child.20 Therefore, the
Court concluded that "drying up" the market, by "imposing
severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or
otherwise promoting the product" was the most effective
means of preventing the abuse of children through child
pornography."'
15. The Court cited past decisions upholding the validity of laws aimed at the
protection of children, despite potential infringements on constitutional rights. For
example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1943), the Court validated a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the use of children in disseminating literature on
the street, despite possible infringements of First Amendment rights. In Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court upheld a New York law protecting children from exposure to nonobscene literature. See 102 S. Ct. at 3354-55.
16. 102 S. Ct. at 3354.
17. 102 S. Ct. at 3355 nn.9-10.
18. Id. at 3355.
19. Id.at 3355-56.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 3356.
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The Supreme Court further rejected the defendant's argument that the distribution of only obscene material, as defined in Miller v. California," should be prohibited, in order
to achieve the legislative purpose of protecting child actors
from sexual abuse and still remain within the realm of constitutionality. The Miller Court determined that a film was obscene and thus without first amendment protection if the
work appealed to the prurient interest of an average person
applying contemporary community standards, the work was
patently offensive, and the work lacked serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.23 The Court found that the
legislative purpose would not be satisfied by applying the statute only to films which met the Miller test for obscenity, because a film not found to be obscene may have nevertheless
sexually abused a child actor in its production.2 '
The third justification advanced by the Court was that
state regulation of child pornography dissemination would be
an effective method of eliminating the "economic motive" for
the illegal activity of child pornography production.' Additionally, the Court found little if any social value in child pornography.' 6 Finally, the Court found that holding child pornography to be an expression outside the first amendment was
consistent with the past decisions.
The Supreme Court, however, found that there were limits as to what constitutes a valid statute proscribing child pornography. First, the statute must adequately describe the conduct prohibited, and whether the conduct to be proscribed is
the production, processing, or distribution of the prohibited
22. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
23. Id. at 24.
24. The Supreme Court held that application of the Miller test failed to pursue
the state's interest in protecting a child from sexual abuse, because a work may not
appeal to the "prurient interest" nor be "patently offensive" and still physically or
psychologically harm the child in the production of the work. The Court also argued
that even serious literary, artistic, and political works may nevertheless involve sexual
abuse of the child. 102 S. Ct. at 3356-57.
25. Id. at 3357.
26. The Court considered it unlikely that literary, scientific, or artistic works
would involve depictions of children performing sexual acts. The Court proposed that
should there be any value in depicting children engaged in sexual activity, then the
alternative of using "a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger"
could be pursued. Id. at 3357.
27. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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material.28 Furthermore, the statute must adequately define
the types of sexual acts which, if depicted in the offensive material, would place the material under the sanctions imposed
by the statute.2 Section 263.15 was found to meet these
requirements.80
The Court overruled the New York Court of Appeals'
finding that the statute was underinclusive by prohibiting
only material which exposed children to the dangers of sexual
abuse, but not other kinds of films which exposed children to
other dangers. Since child pornography is an unprotected
form of expression, the Court held that there was nothing underinclusive about prohibiting only that form of offensive
expression. 8
The Supreme Court also addressed the New York Court
of Appeals' argument that section 263.15 was overinclusive because it potentially banned the distribution of out-of-state
and foreign films utilizing children in sexual performances."'
The Supreme Court pointed out that it is often impossible to
determine where a particular pornographic film was produced,
while the goal of ending any economic incentives in the production of child pornography can best be met by drying up
the entire market. 8 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that
a state could prohibit the promotion of out-of-state as well as
foreign child pornography.84
28.
29.
30.
because

102 S. Ct. at 3358.
Id. at 3358.
Section 263.15 met the limits set by the Supreme Court as a valid statute,
it properly defined the conduct proscribed as the direction, production, or

promotion of "any play, motion picture, photograph or dance . . . or other visual
representation . ..

."

N.Y. PENAL LAW

§

263.4 (McKinney 1980). The second limit

imposed by the Supreme Court was also met, because the statute properly described
the sexual conduct to be forbidden as "actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate
sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse or lewd

exhibition of the genitals." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.3 (McKinney 1980). See 102 S. Ct.
at 3358.

31. The New York Court of Appeals relied on Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205 (1975), in holding that § 263.15 was underinclusive by not banning other

films which exposed children to other dangers. In Erznoznik, the Supreme Court in-

validated a law which banned films showing nudity to prevent distraction of nearby
traffic, but failed to ban other types of films which posed similar hazards to traffic.
The Supreme Court in Ferber distinguished Erznoznik in that nudity may have been
a protected form of expression, child pornography is not. 102 S. Ct. at 3359 n.18.
32. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
33. 102 S. Ct. at 3359 n.19.
34. Id. at 3350, 3359.
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Although the New York Court of Appeals held the statute
was overbroad in that it proscribed the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual acts which possessed
literary, scientific, or educational merit,30 the Supreme Court
did not find it to be overbroad.36 While the defendant did not
claim that the subject matter leading to his conviction possessed literary, scientific, or educational merit, the Supreme
Court nevertheless allowed him to attack the constitutionality
of the statute on this potential overbreadth. The Court
thereby reaffirmed the first amendment overbreadth doctrine,
an exception to the general principle that a defendant norin other situations it
mally cannot attack a statute because
8
7
applied.
unconstitutionally
be
may
The Court reaffirmed its decision in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma," by holding that a statute must be "substantially"
overbroad to be invalid under the first amendment overbreadth doctrine. s The Supreme Court held in Ferberthat no
substantial overbreadth existed.4 0 The legitimate applications
of the statute greatly outweigh those few situations in which
the statute may be unconstitutionally applied,41 and whatever
overbreadth existed would be cured on a case-by-case basis.
The New York v. Ferber decision has extended the category of forms of expression not protected by the first amendment. The Supreme Court has held that fraudulent, libelous,
or slanderous publications of non-political officers or candidates are not protected under the first amendment." In
Miller v. California,3 the Supreme Court held that obscene
films, books, or pictures are also without first amendment pro35. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523 (1981), rev'd 102 S. Ct.
3348, 3364 (1982).
36. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
37. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 573

(1937); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912).
38.

413 U.S. 601 (1973).

39. 102 S. Ct. at 3362. See 413 U.S. at 610.
40. 102 S. Ct. at 3363.
41. "[Wje seriously doubt ... that [the] arguably impermissible applications of
the statute," such as the prosecution of publishers of medical textbooks portraying
children engaged in sexual activity, "amount to more than a tiny fraction of the
materials within the statute's reach." 102 S. Ct. at 3363.
42. Id. at 3358 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)). See also
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,
383 U.S. 53 (1965); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
43. 413 U.S. at 15.
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tection. Ferberhas inserted the depiction of children engaged
in sexual activity, whether obscene or not into the category of
unprotected speech.
This decision now possibly validates similar statutes in
nineteen other states" which also make the distribution or
production of material depicting children engaged in sexual
acts, whether obscene or not, an illegal activity. While California only proscribes the distribution of obscene material depicting children engaged in sexual acts,"4 a recently enacted
California statute makes it illegal to process a film or videotape, obscene or not, which protrays a child under fourteen
years of age engaged in specified sexual conduct."' This stat-

ute probably meets the limits outlined by the Supreme Court
for a constitutionally permissible statute by specifying the
type of conduct proscribed, as well as the type of sexual acts
which, if depicted being performed by a child, places the ma47
terial under the statute's sanctions.
44. The nineteen other states possessing an anti-child pornography statute not
predicated on the material being obscene are: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-355
(Supp. 1981); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-403 (Supp. 1981); Delaware, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1108, 1109 (1979); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 847.014 (1976); Hawaii,
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 707-751 (Supp. 1981); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 531.320,
531.340-531.360 (1980); Lousiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1(A)(3) (West Supp.
1982); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, 8 29A (West Supp. 1982);
Michigan, MICH. Comp. LAWS § 750.145(c)(3) (1982); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. §
97-5-33(4)(Supp. 1981); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (1981); New Jersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4(b)(5) (West 1981); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1021.2
(Supp. 1981-82); Pennsylvania, PA. CoNs. STAT. § 6312(c) (1982); Rhode Island, R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-9-1.1 (1981); Texas, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25 (Vernon 1982);
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206.5(3) (Supp. 1981); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §
61-8C-3 (Supp. 1981); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.203(2) (West Supp. 1981-82).
See 102 S. Ct. at 3351 n.2.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE 8 311.2(b) (West Supp. 1982).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE 8 311.3 (West Supp. 1982) provides that a person is guilty
of sexually exploiting a child under fourteen years old when he or she processes a
film, photograph, or videotape of the child engaged in a sexual act. Punishment is by
a fine up to $2,000 or by imprisonment for no more than one year.
47. Section 311.3 of the California Penal Code would probably satisfy the limits
set forth by the Supreme Court for a valid statute, because it adequately defines the
sexual conduct not to be portrayed by children as the following: "[Slexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals; penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object; masturbation ... ; sadomasochistic abuse
; exhibition of the genitals . . . for the purpose of sexual stimulations of the
viewer; defecation or urination . . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3 (West Supp. 1982).
The California statute also adequately defines the conduct to be prohibited as the
knowing developing, duplicating, printing, exchanging, of any such film, photograph,
videotape, negative, or slide. Id.
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The issue of whether serious art, literary, or educational
materials which depict children engaged in sexual activity can
constitutionally be proscribed remains unsettled.'" In Miller v.
California, the Supreme Court held that a work of serious artistic, scientific, or literary substance may partially fall under
the Miller standard of obscenity, but such material remains
protected by the first amendment.' 9 In fact, the obscenity
standard in Miller explicitly excludes such socially acceptable
forms of expression from the very definition of obscenity.5
In spite of Miller, four Supreme Court Justices, Burger,
Powell, Rehnquist, and White, all of whom joined the majorities in both Miller and Ferber,did not explicitly include such
socially desirable material within first amendment protection
when the material contains depictions of children engaged in
sexual acts.' 1 Because of this either purposeful or nonpurposeful exclusion of socially desirable material from specific
protection under the first amendment, both Justice Brennan
and Justice Stevens stated in their concurring opinions that
they definitely would not leave such material out of the realm
of first amendment protection."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, with whom
Justice Marshall joined, argued that the application of section
263.15 of the New York Penal Law to materials with "serious
literary, artistic, scientific or medical value," which nevertheless depicted children engaged in sexual acts, "would violate
the First Amendment."'" Justice Brennan pointed out that serious contributions to art, literature, or science possess much
more than the slight social value to be found in mere pornography.54 Justice Brennan also argued that the harms inflicted
on a child in the production of pornography would not neces48. It is interesting to note that the scope of CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3 excludes
"legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities" from itssanctions, probably
to avoid possible overbreadth by prohibiting potentially constitutionally protected
materials.
49. 413 U.S. at 15.

50. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
51. Hinting that works of serious art, literature, or science may not be protected
under the first amendment, the Court wrote that such material "may nevertheless
embody the hardest core of child pornography." The Court also quoted New York
Assemblyperson Lasher stating that a child may be sexually abused in the production
of such materials. 102 S. Ct. at 3357.

52. Id. at 3365-66.
53. Id. at 3365 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 3365.
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sarily be inflicted upon a child in the production of serious art
or scientific material."
Justice Stevens went even further by arguing that not
only may serious art, literature, or educational materials portraying children in sexual activities remain protected materials, but so may the pornographic film at issue here depending
upon its use.56 Justice Stevens advocated a case-by-case approach to determine if the subject material merits first
amendment protection. A court, according to Justice Stevens,
would look to the "content and context" of the offending material to determine if it warrants first amendment
7
protection.

In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor did not indicate whether she would confer first amendment protection to
serious art, literature, or educational works if it contained depictions of children engaged in sexual activity. While Justice
O'Connor joined in Justice White's majority opinion, she also
stated in her concurring opinion that the statute may indeed
be overbroad by banning depictions of serious, socially desirable works, but she stressed that the Court's decision in Ferber
conceded only that such potential overbreadth was not substantial enough to warrant invalidating the statute on its
face." Justice O'Connor leaves open the issue of whether socially desirable material containing children engaged in sexual
activity is protected under the first amendment. 9
In conclusion, New York v. Ferber held that a state possesses great latitude in pursuing its compelling interest of protecting its children from abuse and thus can proscribe child
pornography. The Supreme Court considered that child pornography possesses little if any social value, and therefore is
not a form of expression protected by the first amendment.
55. Id.
56. Thus, the exhibition of these films before a legislative committee
studying a proposed amendment to a state law, or before a group of

research scientists studying human behavior, could not, in my opinion
be made a crime. Moreover, it is at least conceivable that a serious work
of art, a documentary on behavior problems, or a medical or psychiatric
teaching device, might include a scene from one of these films and, when

viewed as a whole in a proper setting, be entitled to constitutional
protection.
Id. at 3366 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3364 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 15-27.
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Further, the Court held that a statute prohibiting child pronography is neither underinclusive for banning only
pornographic films as opposed to other types of films which
may endanger children in other ways, nor overbroad if it potentially bans material considered to possess artistic, literary,
educational, or scientific value. 0 The prohibition of out-ofstate and foreign child pornography will also not render such
a statute overinclusive 1 Finally, such a statute remains valid
so long as it stays within the twin limits of adequately defining the conduct to be forbidden and adequately describing the
sexual acts which, if depicted as performed by children, would
place the material under its sanctions.2 What remains to be
answered is the extent to which a state may regulate socially
desirable material without violating first amendment constitutional protections.
Duane Shewaga

60. See supra text accompanying notes 31 & 35-37.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
62. See supra text accompanying note 30.

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY-THE PRESIDENT IS ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM DAMAGES
LIABILITY FOR OFFICIAL ACTS AND FOR ACTS
WITHIN THE "OUTER PERIMETER" OF HIS OFFICIAL
DUTIES-Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
Respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald was dismissed in January 1970 from his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force.1 The reasons given for his dismissal were a departmental reorganization and a reduction in
work force. Believing that his dismissal was an unlawful retaliation for his testimony before a Congressional subcommittee,
Fitzgerald exhausted his administrative remedies to no avail.3
He subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, naming as defendants a number
of government officials including President Richard M. Nixon
and White House aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander
Butterfield.4
Denying defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
district court ruled that Fitzgerald had stated three triable
causes of action under 5 U.S.C. section 7211,1 18 U.S.C. sec© 1983 by Jesper Rasmussen
1. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2693 (1982).
2. In late 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before a Congressional subcommittee
that cost-overruns on the C-5A transport plane were expected to reach approximately
two billion dollars. Id. at 2694 (citing Economics of Military Procurement:Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-201 (1968-69)).
3. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission which ruled that his
dismissal had not been in compliance with Civil Service regulations and recommended reinstatement. The Commission, however, did not agree that Fitzgerald's dismissal had been retaliatory in nature. Id. at 2696.
4. Fitzgerald first named several Defense Department officials and Alexander
Butterfield. The district court dismissed the action because the three-year statute of
limitations had run. Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The
court of appeals affirmed the decision with respect to all the defendants except for
Butterfield because the acts alleged against him had been concealed until at least
1973. Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1977). On remand, Fitzgerald
filed a second amended complaint joining defendants Nixon and Harlow.
5. Section 7211 provides: "The right of employees, individually or collectively,
to petition Congress or a Member of Congress, or to furnish information to either
House of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with
or denied." 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. IV 1980).
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tion 1505,6 and the first amendment' to the Constitution. In
addition, the court ruled that Nixon was not entitled to claim
absolute immunity. 8 The court of appeals dismissed summarily a collateral appeal regarding the immunity issue.'
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
held: (1) Nixon, as a former President of the United States, is
entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for acts
committed within his official duties, and (2) this immunity extends to all acts within the "outer perimeter" of his duties of
office. 10

The Court began by discussing the doctrine of immunity
as applied to government officials. Historically, government
officials engaged in official duties have enjoyed some form of
immunity from civil liability suits. In Spalding v. Vilas," the
Court held that in a suit for damages against the Postmaster
General for acts falling within the ambit of his authority, the
"interests of the people" necessitated a grant of absolute immunity. 12 The justification for granting this absolute immunity was that the "proper and effective administration of public affairs"' 8 would be crippled if executive officials were
restrained in their duties by fear of possible damages liability.
The Court next examined the scope of immunity available to state legislators and observed that following the passage
of 42 U.S.C. section 1983,'" the immunity traditionally afforded state legislators at common law remained unchanged.'"
State executive officials who are sued for constitutional rights
6. Section 1505 generally makes it a crime, punishable by not more than $5,000
or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, to obstruct Congressional testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976).
7.

"Congress shall make no law.

right of the people

. . .

. .

abridging the freedom of speech.

. .

or the

to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.

CONST. amend. I.
8. It did so presumably following Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), a/i'd, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2697.
9. 102 S. Ct. at 2697.

10. 102 S. Ct. at 2701, 2705.
11.
12.
13.
14.

161 U.S. 483 (1896).
Id. at 498.
102 S. Ct. at 2699 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)).
Section 1983 provides in part that: "[E]very person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
15. 102 S. Ct. at 2699 (citing Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)).
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violations under section 1983, however, are entitled to only a
qualified immunity. 16 The Court found that state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity when charged with
section 1983 violations. Referring to its decision in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, the Court remarked:
Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives
of public policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a
qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of government, the variation being dependent
upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time17 of the action on which liability is
sought to be based.

Subsequent cases, the Court points out, have construed
Scheuer to mean that most executive officers have an immunity defense qualified by the nature and range of their official
duties, while officials with especially sensitive duties such as
judges and prosecutors, require a grant of absolute
immunity. 18
Following its discussion of cases in which violations of
section 1983 were alleged, the Court then went on to consider
cases in which direct constitutional violations were alleged. In
Butz v. Economou," the applicability of absolute immunity
for federal executive officials sued for constitutional violations
was rejected because it would be inconsistent to give qualified
immunity to state executive officials but to grant absolute immunity to federal officials. Hence, for purposes of immunity
law, there should be no distinction between suits brought
under section 1983 against state officials and suits alleging
constitutional violations brought against federal officials. But,
the Court noted, absolute immunity may be appropriate in
certain cases for officials whose functions are analogous to
16. With respect to the basis of qualified immunity, the Court has stated: "It is
the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of
all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct."
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
17. 102 S.Ct. at 2700 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974)).
18. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (state judges have absolute immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors have absolute immunity).
19.

438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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judges and prosecutors.2 0
The Court then changed its focus from considerations of
precedent to the approach it would take in the instant case.
Recognizing that immunity law has been shaped by the Constitution, federal statutes, history, and common law, the Court
noted that because of the unique constitutional status of the
President, policies and principles inapplicable to other government officials must be considered.2" A President should not
be subjected to private lawsuits because his decisions concern
matters likely to be controversial and it is in the public interest to provide him "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly
and impartially with" the duties of his office.2
The Court then briefly discussed how it has historically
looked to the justifying purpose of the immunity when deciding the scope of immunity for a particular official. In so doing,
the Court has usually extended an official's absolute immunity
to acts in the performance of particular functions of his
office.28
In the present case, the Court chose not to take this functional approach 2' and instead held that the President has absolute immunity "from damages liability for acts within the
'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility. '

25

The Court

feared that a functional approach would require determining
which of the President's many functions is involved in a particular action and thus lead to highly intrusive inquiries into
the motives of the President. "Adoption of this construction
thus would deprive absolute immunity of its intended
effect."2'
The Court noted that while its holding may appear to
place the President "above the law,"'2 7 the nation is not with-

20. Id. at 504, 508-09.
21. 102 S. Ct. at 2705 and 2707-08 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
22. Id. at 2703 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).
23. Id. at 2705.
24. It is the functional approach, the dissent argues, that runs through all the
court's past immunity decisions. By failing to distinguish those types of Presidential
conduct which should require absolute immunity from those which should not is, in
effect, a reversion to the old view that "the king can do no wrong." As Justice White
points out: "[aittaching absolute immunity to the office of the President, rather than

the particular activities that the President might perform, places the President above
the law." Id. at 2711.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 2705.
Id.
Id. at 2706 n.41.
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out remedies for Presidential misconduct:
There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment
S. .. [T]he President is subjected to constant scrutiny
by the press. Vigilant oversight by Congress may also
serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to
make credible the threat of impeachment. Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of
Presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his historical stature."'
Several questions remain unanswered following the view
the Court has adopted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.First and foremost is exactly how courts are to define this "outer perimeter"
of Presidential responsibility. Although the Court acknowl-

edges there are problems in the functional approach caused
by the difficulties inherent in determing which function is in-

volved in a particular action, 9 the same difficulties are present if one attempts to determine whether a particular action
is within the "outer perimeter" of a President's official re-

sponsibility. The Court's silence on the definition of the
"outer perimeter" will inevitably result in more "intrusive inquiries," thereby defeating one of the Court's primary goals in
Fitzgerald.

An additional question which merits attention is the viability of the checks on Presidential misconduct which the
Court views as sufficient. Impeachment, for example, is available only for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde28. Id. at 2706 (footnotes omitted).
29. Id. at 2705. But compare the fears the Court had in Butz and why adoption
of a functional approach would tend to minimize those fears:
The extension of absolute immunity from damages liability to all federal
executive officials would seriously erode the protection provided by basic
constitutional guarantees. The broad authority possessed by these officials enables them to direct their subordinates to undertake a wide
range of projects-including some which may infringe such important
personal interests such as liberty, property, and free speech. It makes
little sense to hold that a Government agent is liable for warrantless and
forcible entry into a citizen's house . . . but that an official of higher

rank who actually orders such a burglary is immune simply because of
his greater authority. Indeed, the greater power of such officials affords a
greater potential for ...

lawless conduct .... In situations of abuse,

an action for damages against the responsible official can be an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees.
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505-06.
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meanors." 0 In cases such as Mr. Fitzgerald's, one would be
hard-pressed to believe that Congress would institute impeachment proceedings as a remedy for Presidential
misconduct.
Short of impeachment, Congress can apparently effectuate no legislation to curb potential abuses of power. The
Court, in a footnote, remarks: "[O]ur holding today need only
be that the President is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts in the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide only this constitutional issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case
before us."81 But because the Court grounds its decision in the
Constitution, it appears unlikely that legislative action can
contravene such a result., Because the Court wishes to avoid
intrusive inquiries into Presidential motives, the question remains unanswered what, if any, checks the judiciary may have
on Presidential abuse of power. Self-imposed restraints s to
which the Court refers may be the only checks that remain in
existence after Fitzgerald and their efficacy is in doubt.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald,the Court held that a President is
entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for acts
within the "outer perimeter" of his official responsibility.
Problems may arise when courts are to determine in a particular case where the "outer perimeter" of Presidential responsibility lies. The viability of checks including impeachment for
Presidential abuse of power is questionable in cases where
claims such as Mr. Fitzgerald's are presented.
Jesper Rasmussen

30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Whether only criminal offenses are impeachable is a
matter of much scholarly debate. See generally R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CoNSTTUrTONAL PROBLEMS chs. II & VI (1973).
31. 102 S. Ct. at 2701 n.27.
32. In this respect, Chief Justice Burger in his concurrence and Justice White in
his dissent are in agreement. Id. at 2709 n.7 (Burger, C.J. concurring) and 2712-13 n.4
(White, J., dissenting).
33. See aupra text accompanying note 27.

ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS-THE MANDATORY
CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
FOR CALIFORNIA
PEACE OFFICERS PRIMARILY SERVES A POLITICAL
FUNCTION AND DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT-Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735
(1982).
Plaintiff Chavez-Salido, born in Mexico, had been a permanent legal resident of the United States since 1955. He received his formal education in California, including a Bachelor
of Arts degree in Mexican-American Studies from California
State University at Long Beach. In March 1975, ChavezSalido applied for the position of Deputy Probation Officer II
with the County of Los Angeles. This position required a minimum passing score of 70 on an oral examination. ChavezSalido scored a 95 on the exam, and was placed on an eligibility list. Shortly thereafter, he was notified that an opening existed, but that he would be required to show proof of citizenship in order to secure the position. Although his citizenship
application was pending, Chavez-Salido was denied employment. The denial was made pursuant to California Government Code section 1031(a),1 which requires peace officers to
be citizens, and section 830.5 of the California Penal Code2
© 1983 by Lori A. Walth
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1031(a) (West 1980). That section provides that a peace
officer must be at least 18 years old, fingerprinted, of good moral character, a high
school graduate (or the equivalent thereof), physically and mentally healthy, and a
citizen of the United States. Originally, only four positions were granted peace officer
status: sheriff, policeman, marshall and constable. See Hetherington v. California
State Personnel Bd., 82 Cal. App. 3d 582, 597, 147 Cal. Rptr. 300, 309 (1978). Subsequently, the California legislature embarked on a piecemeal approach in adding to
the list. In 1961 section 1031 was passed requiring mandatory citizenship for those
the legislature had deemed to be peace officers. See Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490 F.
Supp. 984, 986 (1980).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982). Various subsections
under California Penal Code section 830 provide a long list of positions classified as
peace officers or having the powers thereof. See Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp.
158, 169-70 n.22 (1977). These positions range from important law enforcement personnel, such as sheriffs and members of the National Guard, to positions having menial duties such as inspectors of the Bureau of Furniture and Bedding Inspection,
sealers of the Department of Weights and Measures, and messengers of the State
Treasurer's Office.
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which categorizes probation officers as peace officers.
Chavez-Salido was later offered and accepted the position
of Deputy Probation Officer Trainee, which did not require
citizenship status. In March 1975 his citizenship petition was
granted, but by that time his name had been removed from
the eligibility list for the Officer II position. He was later promoted to Deputy Probation Officer I, a job of lesser status
than the Officer II position but which also required a showing
of citizenship.
Plaintiff Ybarra, born in Spain, had been a permanent
resident alien since 1972. He completed undergraduate work
in Spain, received a Masters of Arts in African Studies from
the University of California at Los Angeles, and was pursuing
another graduate degree in sociology at California State University at Long Beach. He had not applied for citizenship.
Ybarra initially applied for all three probation officer positions, and scored 70 on the competency exam. Although a job
opening existed in the Deputy I category, he was denied employment solely on the basis of the statutory citizenship
requirement.
Plaintiff Bohorquez, a permanent resident alien since
1961, was born in Columbia. He earned a Bachelor of Arts in
Latin American Studies from the University of California at
Los Angeles. Bohorquez was told during his examination for
the probation officer positions, that he could not secure either
the Deputy I or Deputy II position because he lacked proof of
citizenship. He subsequently received notice that he failed the
exam, and did not appeal the result after being told by
County employees that because he was not a citizen, his appeal would be useless.
Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory judgment that
California Government Code section 1031(a) was unconstitutional, and seeking injunctive relief, money damages, and attorneys fees. Plaintiff Chavez-Salido sought an order requiring
his appointment to the Deputy II position and damages in the
form of back pay. Plaintiff Ybarra sought to be appointed to
the Deputy I position and retroactive pay, and Plaintiff
Bohorquez sought the opportunity to retake the examination.
Plaintiffs challenged section 1031(a) under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and sections 1981
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and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,3 claiming unlawful discrimination based on alienage.4
The District Court for the Central District of California
decided in 1977 that the statutory citizenship requirement
was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, both on its
face and as applied. 5 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision for further consideration in
light of two of the Court's recent decisions: Foley v. Connelie,6
decided in 1978, which upheld a New York law excluding
aliens from the position of State Police Trooper, and its 1979
decision, Ambach v. Norwich,7 which upheld the constitutionality of a New York law barring noncitizens from teaching in
the public schools. On remand, the district court followed its
original decision that section 1031(a) was unconstitutional,
finding that the intervening Supreme Court decisions did not
undermine the requirement that citizenship could only be imposed by means of a statute that was narrowly drawn. 8 On
direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that alien
classifications "need not be precise; there need only be a substantial fit." 9
The majority opinion clearly articulated two sub-classes
and a two-tiered standard of review which will be applied to
alien classifications. The Court held that statutes primarily affecting aliens' economic interests were subject to heightened
judicial review, but in cases where a statute's restrictions
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1976). As the District Court noted, plaintiffs could
have successfully sued in state court. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. at 172
n.29. A recent line of California decisions struck down various statutory restrictions
on aliens. See, e.g., Raffaelli v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d
1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972) (invalidating a citizenship requirement for the practice of law); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of Cal., 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1969) (invalidating CAL. LAB. CODE § 1850 which prohibited the employment of aliens on public works). Additionally, the Legislature in 1970 repealed a
blanket statute which required that every employee of the state, county, and city
must be a citizen. See historical note preceding CAL. LAB. CODE § 1960 (West 1971).
In that same year, the Attorney General declared CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1031(a) and its

attendant citizenship requirement unconstitutional. 53 Op. Att'y Gen. 63 (1970).
4. Additionally, the complaint charged that section 1031(a) unconstitutionally
infringed on the plaintiffs' right to travel and upon congressional power to regulate
aliens. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158, 161 (1977).

5. Id. at 171-72.
6. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
7. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
8. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. 984 (1980).
9. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735, 741 (1982).
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serve a state's interest in establishing its own form of government, a lesser standard of review will be applied."0 Thus, in
reaffirming that a rational relationship standard was adhered
to in Foley and Ambach and will be appropriate in the future,
the Court reaffirmed and clarified that alienage classifications
will receive strict review when regulations attempt to retain
certain economic benefits for citizens only.
In articulating the lesser standard of review to be applied
where a statute serves a political function, the majority expanded on the Court's notions developed in Sugarman v.
Dougall. 11 In Sugarman, the Court invalidated a blanket disqualification of aliens for state civil service employment."2 The
majority interpreted Sugarman as requiring a two step analysis to be used to determine whether a particular restriction on
legal resident aliens would be valid."3 First, the specificity of
the classification would be analyzed, with a focus on whether
or not it was over or underinclusive. 1 4 Second, the Court
would examine the nature of the position for which it was asserted that a citizenship requirement was necessary. 5 Citing
Sugarman, the majority noted that a restriction was valid
only if it was tailored to "persons holding state elective, legislative and judicial positions" that "[went] to the heart of the
representative government.""
Applying the lesser standard of review, the majority concluded that the citizenship requirement of California Government Code section 1031(a) was not overinclusive.1 7 The Court
rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the requirement was overly
broad because it encompassed seventy positions that had been
classified as peace officers, a number of which could not be
regarded as members of the "political community."1 8 Thus, in
applying the Sugarman standard, the Court applied a mere
rational relationship level of review.19 It gave a strong pre10. Id. at 739.

11. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
12. Id. at 646.
13. 102 S. Ct. at 740.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647).
17. 102 S. Ct. at 741-42.
18. Id. at 740-41. See supra text accompanying note 2.
19. The theory of rationality governs the relationship of the governmental
means to the governmental ends. The test assumes that statutes have a legitimate
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sumption of validity to the statute by admitting that the review entailed only a "casual reading" of the Code.20 The majority found that the district court was incorrect in assuming
1
that if the statute was overinclusive at all it could not stand.2
The Court reasoned that the statute was sufficiently tailored to withstand the lesser standard of review articulated in
Sugarman, in that the "questionable classifications were relatively few in number," 2 ' and that the unifying character of all
categories of peace officers was their law enforcement
function."
The majority further rejected plaintiffs' argument that
section 1031(a) was underinclusive because it failed to include
all positions that performed peace officer functions and that it
failed to include other positions in the judiciary that performed functions similar to those of a probation officer."
Even though the majority stated that underinclusiveness
would be part of the criteria of the rational relationship review, it treated such an argument summarily.' 5 The majority
noted that unlike Sugarman, which dealt with a broad statutory disqualification, section 1031(a) dealt with the limited
category of peace officer. Underinclusiveness, therefore, was
public purpose that carries with it a strong presumption of validity. The means employed by the state must only be rationally related to the presumed legitimate public
purpose. The Burger Court has invalidated more statutes under the rational relation-

ship standard than preceding Courts, but in these cases, the means adopted by the
state appear to be capricious. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)
(social security benefits denied to widowers); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)

(criminal sanctions for distributing contraceptives to unmarried persons); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (upon the death of the mother, children of unwed fathers
became wards of the state); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (male relatives of deceased automatically selected for estate administration).
20.

102 S. Ct. at 741.

21. Id.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 742 n.10. After this litigation began, the California legislature
twice amended sections of the Penal Code adding a substantial number of other positions and deleting a few others from that list. Notably deleted were toll service employees, inspectors with the Bureau of Livestock, and cemetary sextons. See ChavezSalido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. 984, 986-87 n.6 (1980).
23. 102 S. Ct. at 741.
24. Id. at 742-43 n.12. In support of their underinclusive argument, the plaintiffs noted that California gives the power to arrest to a number of public employees

who are not peace officers, but does not require such employees to be citizens. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 830.7 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982) (describing persons who are not peace

officers but have the power to arrest). It was also argued that any private person,
including permanent resident aliens, have the power to arrest. CAL.PENAL CODE § 837
(West 1970 & Supp. 1982).
25' 102 S. Ct. at 742 n.12. The majority treated this argument in a footnote.
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relevant only in terms of that specific category. The majority
concluded that because there were only two categories of positions that possessed the unifying feature of the arrest power
that had not been included in the peace officer category, the
statute was not underinclusive 2 6
The second step of the review process deemed by the majority to be required by Sugarman focused on the nature of
the position in question. Following Sugarman, the Court
noted that a valid citizenship requirement could be applied
only to "persons holding state elective or important non-elective legislative and judicial positions" involving functions such
formulation, operation or
as "participat[ion] directly in the
' 7
review of broad public policy. "
The majority held that "Foley and Ambach did not describe the outer limits of permissible citizenship requirements."'28 It further held that peace officers in general and
deputy probation officers in particular fell within the group of
public service positions which state and local governments
could reserve for citizens. 29 The majority reasoned that certain
functions of peace officers and probation officers supported
the finding that a citizenship requirement was valid. First, a
peace officer "[partook] of the sovereign's power to exercise
coercive force over the individual." 80 Second, probation officers in particular had "discretion that must be exercised in
the instance without direct supervision."3 1 Finally, a probation officer acted as "an extension of the judiciary's authority
executive's authority to
to set conditions of probation, and the3 82
coerce obedience to those conditions.
Although the Court did not indicate a determinative
method of weighing and balancing these factors, in its analysis
the majority places the greatest emphasis on probation officers' enforcement function. The Court found that California
granted probation officers the power to arrest and release
26. Id. The majority cited CAL. PENAL CODE § 803.7 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982)
which gives the arrest power to non-peace officers such as security officers at institu-

tions of higher education and certain individuals designated by a cemetary authority.
27. 102 S. Ct. at 740 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
28. 102 S. Ct. at 742.
29.

Id. at 743.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32. Id.
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those over whom they had jurisdiction." Further, the majority
noted that probation officers exercised the State's coercive
force by having the power to determine whether to institute
judicial proceedings against a minor and whether to release or
detain offenders. 4
The majority placed further emphasis on the "importance
of the governmental function as a factor giving substance to
the concept of democratic self-government."3 5 As an extension
of the judiciary's authority, the Court reasoned that probation
officers symbolized the community's control over those who
violate the social order.
The significance of Cabell v. Chavez-Salido is best understood through an examination of prior Supreme Court rulings
on alienage classifications. In Graham v. Richardson," the
Burger Court explicitly stated that "classifications based on
alienage, like those based on nationality or race are inherently
suspect and subject to judicial scrutiny. 37 Subsequently, in a
line of decisions, the Court struck down statutory discrimination against aliens by demanding strict scrutiny of the purported justification. It progressively reaffirmed judicial acknowledgement that alienage would be treated as a suspect
classification." The Court formed no clear test for determining whether a class is suspect, but certain factors emerged
from the decisions.3 9 These factors include historical disad33. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 830.5, 836 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982); §§
1203.2, 1203.1(a) (West 1982)).
34. 102 S. Ct. 743 (citing CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 628, 653-54 (West 1972 &
Supp. 1982)).
35. 102 S. Ct. at 740 n.7.
36. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In Graham, the Court invalidated a state's denial of

welfare benefits to resident aliens. Graham signaled heightened judicial scrutiny by
placing alien classifications within the review required where governmental action "is
tainted by prejudice against discrete and insular minorities." United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The strict scrutiny test that
has evolved from Carolene Products acknowledges that enactments that might suggest prejudice against selected discrete and insular minorities must be demonstrated
to be necessary and precisely drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. See In

re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
37.

403 U.S. at 372.

38. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (New York statute excluding
aliens that had not applied for citizenship from receiving state educational aid held
unconstitutional); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976)
(Puerto Rican statute banning aliens from practice of engineering held unconstitutional); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state's exclusion of aliens from admission

to the practice of law held unconstitutional).
39.

See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (discussing
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vantage, relative lack of political representation, highly visible
characteristics, and immutable characteristics. The fact that
aliens are eligible for citizenship status supports an argument
against suspect classification because their distinguishing
characteristic is not immutable. Aliens, however, are politically powerless since they do not have the right to vote. 4° Additionally, aliens have suffered economic and political discrimination of various kinds.
In Sugarman v. Dougall the Court carved out an exception to its blanket declaration in Graham that "scrutiny will
'
not be so demanding where the state interest comes in."41
Sugarman limited the state interest to that authority's constitutional responsibility for establishing its own government.
This responsibility includes setting citizenship requirements
for an appropriately designated class of public office holder.
The Sugarman holding appeared to require a mere rationality
standard of review where political interests were involved.
The majority, however, appeared to reinstate strict scrutiny
when it declared that the restriction must be "narrowly confined."'42 This choice of words by the Sugarman majority suggested the adoption of the "precisely drawn" means aspect of
48
the strict scrutiny test.
The district court followed this language in its 1977 decision in Chavez-Salido and determined that California Government Code section 1031(a) and its mandatory citizenship
requirements was overly broad. 4 In the later cases of Foley v.
Connelie45 and Ambach v. Norwich,4" however, the Supreme
Court attempted to interpret the Sugarman exception as requiring a rational relationship standard. When Chavez-Salido
was remanded following Foley and Ambach, the district court
why classifications based on age are not deemed to be suspect).
40. In its voting rights decisions, the Court has developed the notion that citizenship is a permissible requirement for limiting the right. Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966).
41. 413 U.S. at 648.
42. Id. at 649.
43. Throughout the Sugarman decision, Justice Blackmun writing for the majority, uses the words narrow and precise interchangeably. E.g., id. at 643. This indiscriminate use of equal protection language evidences the Court's indecisiveness on
classification issues that lead to confusion, as demonstrated by the Cabell case.
44. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158, 170 (1977).
45. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
46. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
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found those cases to nonetheless require a narrowly drawn
statute. 7 The district court found that in Foley, the Supreme
Court had reaffirmed the validity of strict scrutiny when it
stated that "a state may not accomplish its goals by a citizenship restriction that sweeps indiscriminately.' 8 Further, the
district court in Chavez-Salido found the statute in Foley requiring citizenship to be narrowly drawn in that it applied
only to State Police Troopers of the New York State Police."
Additionally, the district court found the statute in Ambach
to be narrowly drawn because it applied only to persons employed to teach in New York public schools. 0 In ChavezSalido, however, the Supreme Court put an end to the debate
surrounding the Sugarman dictum, Foley, and Ambach by applying the rational relationship standard of review to a broadbased statute. 1
In a terse dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, criticized the majority view
because it "re[wrote] the Court's precedents, ignore[d] history, defie[d] common sense, and reinstate[d] the deadening
mantle of state parochialism in public employment.' 2
The dissent argued that Sugarman and its progeny required a strict standard of review for all alien classifications in
which the means adopted by the state must be precisely
drawn." The proper review initially required the state to
demonstrate that it had historically reserved a particular position for its citizens as a matter of its "constitutional prerogative."' The dissent was deeply troubled by the majority's superficial treatment of the history and purpose of section
1031(a)."
The dissent found the statute to be underinclusive in two
ways. First the dissent pointed out that the statute failed to
include many judicial officers that perform duties similar to
47. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. 984, 985 (1980).
48. Id. (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 296 n.5).
49. 490 F. Supp. at 986.
50. Id.
51. 102 S. Ct. at 743.
52. Id. at 744 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 745 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 749 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 648 (1973)).
55. 102 S. Ct. at 746 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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those performed by probation officers.56 In support of that argument the absurdity of mandating a citizenship requirement
for probation officers was put into context of the judicial machine: "A criminal defendant in California may be represented
at trial and on appeal by an alien attorney, have his case tried
before an alien judge and appealed to an alien justice and
then have his probation supervised by a county probation department headed by an alien." 7
Secondly, the dissent argued that the statute failed to include all positions that perform peace officer functions: "The
Court's hollow assertion that the legislature has reserved its
sovereign coercive power for its citizens ignores the reality
that the state has already bestowed some of these powers on
private persons including aliens.""
Additionally, the dissent argued that the statute was fatally overinclusive; it barred aliens from a number of public
positions where the state's proffered justification had little, if
any, relevance.5 9 The dissent agreed with the lower court
which found the statute to bar aliens from positions which
could not "be considered members of the political community
no matter how liberally that category [was] viewed." 60
The dissent was further concerned that Foley and
Ambach required a stronger determination to be made as to
the amount of control and authority exercised by the position
in question. 1 Foley held that policemen must be citizens because they were clothed with what the majority there described as "plenary discretionary powers."' "6 Furthermore, Foley determined that police exercised a "pervasive presence in
modern society."' 8 They also act "without prior judicial authority," which demands "very high degrees of judgment and
discretion, the abuse or misuse of which may have a serious
impact on individuals." 64 As viewed by the dissent, probation
officers did not perform anywhere near the duties required for
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
F. Supp.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 747.
Id. at 750 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 749 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 747.
Id. at 747 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490
984, 987 (1980)).
102 S. Ct. at 748 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 298).
Id.
435 U.S. at 297-99.
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a determination that their position "[went] to the heart of the
representative government." A probation officer's duties, the
dissent reasoned, primarily involved investigation, recommendation, and advising the judiciary. 6" All of these functions
were performed within the ambit of narrowly proscribed statutory limitations. 67 The dissent argued that to deem such
functions as necessitating a citizenship requirement supported
the prediction that judicial employees such as prison guards,
bailiffs, and court clerks could be required by the Court in
future cases to be citizens."
Chavez-Salido departed from past cases that dealt with
alienage classifications used in state and local law. The majority attempted to end the debate surrounding the Sugarman
dictum that certain narrowly confined alienage classifications
would be deemed valid if they effectuated a substantial interest. The majority clarified and affirmed its prior holdings in
Foley and Ambach by adhering to a minimum rationality
standard of review for state action that discriminates against
aliens where the goal is to preserve the political community.
However, the Court failed to closely examine the content
and history of section 1031(a) and take those considerations
into account. In sustaining a broad based statutory citizenship
requirement, the Court actually set the level of review apart
from Foley and Ambach which also purported to have applied
a lesser measure of scrutiny.
Additionally, when the Court stated that Foley and
Ambach did not set the outer limits of permissible citizenship
requirements, and classified probation officers with police officers and teachers, it dramatically expanded the validity of
discrimination in public employment. A probation officer's
functions differ significantly from those of a State Trooper or
a school teacher. An examination of these positions reveals
the approach the Court may have been taking to the new
"outer limits" of citizenship requirements. One common function of teachers and State Troopers is that they deal with a
65.

102 S. Ct. at 748 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647).

66. 102 S. Ct. at 750.
67. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 830.5, 1203.2, 1203.1(a) (West Supp. 1981) (powers
of arrest and release), § 1203.1 (West 1970) (power of supervision); CAL. WEL. & INST.
CODE §§ 309, 313, 315 (West Supp. 1981) (power to release or detain), §§ 630, 653-654
(West 1970) (power to initiate judicial proceedings).
68. 102 S. Ct. at 750 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

702

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

large section of the community. This element is lacking in the
probation officer's position; the Court thus has narrowed the
scope of required public contact. Furthermore, the nature and
scope of required supervisory powers has been narrowed,
given that the average offender receives between seven to nine
minutes of consultation per week with a probation officer."
The level of policy making power required of the position was
further lowered by Chavez-Salido. As the dissent pointed out
and the regulatory codes require, a probation officer's decisions are neither original nor final.
The sole characteristic that appears as a constant in the
Court's decisions is the high level of coercive force exercised
by the position in question. In Chavez-Salido the Court expanded on the unarticulated notion developed in Foley that
any control by aliens over citizens is repugnant to citizens.
In summary, the Court has left open the possibility of expanding the categories of government jobs that may validly
require citizenship status. It further leaves unanswered what
the nature of the heightened review will be in cases that discriminate against aliens in the distribution of economic benefits. The majority fails to describe what this review will entail,
but cites Graham as suggesting that aliens will retain their
suspect class status for this purpose and for this purpose
alone.
It is questionable how the subdivision of the suspect class
standard of review will affect future decisions in alien and
equal protection cases. The Court's retreat from the Graham
pronouncement that aliens are a suspect class demonstrates a
lack of judicial discipline to firmly establish and adhere to
equal protection standards of review. The Court is now locked
into a two-tiered level of analysis in which alienage classifications are deemed suspect, but not suspect enough to receive
strict scrutiny at all times.
Lori A. Walth

69. Id. at 750 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the Federal Judicial Center,
Probation Time Study 3 (February 26, 1973)).

